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Abstract
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The World Bank-financed development project studied in this paper aimed to greatly
reduce absolute poverty in the targeted villages in one of China's poorest regions.  However,
when judged by a widely used measure of poverty, the project appears to have had a
disappointing impact. Initially, about 60% of people in project villages lived in households  with
consumption expenditure per person less than $1 per day (at 1993 Purchasing Power Parity).
The poverty rate then fell by seven percentage points over a five-year period. Over the same
period, the poverty rate fell by two points in sampled non-project villages.  So it appears that the
project was only responsible for a five percentage-point  decline in the incidence of poverty.
It is entirely possible that this development project had only modest impact in the
targeted villages. It cannot be presumed that simply targeting external resources to poor areas
will reduce poverty in those areas, in the short term or longer-term.  The external resources might
displace existing domestic funding sources, with little or no net gain in the short-term or long-
term.  The central and provincial  governments  in China have their own poor-area programs,
which have been a key instrument of anti-poverty policies in China since the mid-1980s
(Leading Group,  1988; World Bank, 1992,  1997; Park et al., 2002).  The World Bank's project
was only available to counties that were in the set of centrally-designated  "national poor"
counties that were already receiving help from the government's  own program.  The extra
funding from the Bank may have led the provincial or central governments to decrease their own
support to the targeted poor areas.  Or there may have been a commensurate net gain in
resources, but this displaced private investment, with little longer-term  gain.  Or the short-term
income gains may simply be unsustainable much beyond the project cycle without an injection of
further fLmding.
2However, before concluding that t]he project failed to have much impact on poverty in the
targeted villages, one needs to consider how the poverty rectuction objective should be measured
and how impact in achieving it should be assessed.  One issue is the poverty line; the
Government's own poverty line is about $0.70 per day. Possibly there were higher impacts
below the $1 per day standard.
A second issue is whether the non-project villages  are indicative of what would have
happened over time in the project villages  without the project.  Possibly the targeted villages had
intrinsically lower growth prospects. For example,  given their poor infrastructure, the counter-
factual for the project villages may entail lower subsequent income growth rates than found in
the better-endowed villages not targeted by the project; Jalan and Ravallion (1998) provide
supportive evidence on this point for the government's poor-area programs in rural China.
A third possibility is that the inter-temporal behavior of participants has somehow hidden
the project's true impact.  It is often assumed that poor people tend to consume the current
income gains from a successful development proeject. However,  this can be questioned.  Poor
people are unlikely to be especially myopic;  indeed, there is a large body of evidence consistent
with the view that poor people think about the longer-term  implications of their current
consumption and savings choices  given the uncertainties  they face.2 If the current income gains
are known to be permanent, and markets work well, then the consumption gains would be
revealed within the project cycle.  However, if the income gains are seen to be transient then they
will be saved, rather than currently consLmed.  High savings from the current income gains
might also arise from uncertainty  about future income gains, or from positive program effects on
the retums to saving, given credit market failures.
2  For reviews of the theory and evidence see Deaton (1992) and Besley (1995).
3We employ impact evaluation methods to assess these issues.  Survey data collected for
this purpose are used to compare the changes in distributions of consumption and incomes for
project villages with those found in a set of comparable non-project villages in the declared
national-poor  countries. Propensity-score  matching methods are used to assure similarity of
treatment and comparison units in terms of observed characteristics  at the baseline.  We then
assess poverty impacts over a wide range of  poverty lines for both consumption  and income, so
as to identify inter-temporal  behavioral responses to the program.
The following section describes the setting and program.  In section 3 we turn to our data,
while section 4 outlines our method for identifying impacts on income and consumption.
Section 5 suggests some theoretical  arguments as to why the income gains from a project might
not be evident in current living standards.  Section 6 then presents our empirical  results and
discusses their implications.  Section 7 concludes.
2.  Poor-area programs in rural China
It is widely acknowledged that many inland rural areas have been lagging in China's
overall economic  success over the last two decades.  Wide geographic disparities have emerged,
notably between the coast and remote resource-deficient  inland areas (Jian et al.,  1996; Khan and
Riskin,  1998; World Bank,  1992,1997).  Partly in response to this problem, anti-poverty policies
in China have emphasized poor-area development (World Bank, 1992,  1997). Local
infrastructure is improved and credit is provided for private (farm and non-farm) investments.
There is evidence that these programs have been reaching poor rural areas within rural
southwest China. Using survey and administrative  data for 1985-90, Jalan and Ravallion (1998)
show that the counties chosen tended to be poorer, by a wide range of criteria, than those not
4picked.3 At the same time, there are also signs fro. nthe same study of unconditional (absolute
and relative) divergence  over time between the coiunties covcred by the program and those not.
In the five years after these programs began (198:5-90),  average consumption growth rates in the
counties covered in southern China were actually lower than  growth rates in the areas not
covered (Jalan and Ravallion,  1998).
However, a bias in the impact estimates for such poor-area programs can be expected if
one simply compares  growth rates in areas targeted by the program and those not, given that
whether or not an area is targeted depends on observable differences  in local characteristics that
are also likely to influence growth prospects (Ravallion,  1998).  On controlling for geographic
heterogeneity in a micro consumption growth model, Jalan and Ravallion (1998) find thal:
households living in areas targeted by the progralmi had higher consumption growth than one
would have expected. The gains from the program were enough to prevent absolute decline.  But
they were not enough to reverse the underlying divergent tendencies  in the rural economy.
Significant impacts on average incomes from the program are also found by Park et al (2002),
using income growth regressions  on county data over all of China.  However,  Park et al. found a
diminished impact from the program in the  1990s (relative to the  1980s).
A substantial increase in external  aid for poor-area development in China began in 1995
with the World Bank's Southwest Poverty Reduction Project (SWPRP). This aimed to reluce
poverty by augmenting the private and (local) public capital stock of farm-households  in poor
areas. The program was targeted to poor villages  vithin 35 designated "national poor" counties
in Guangxi, Guizhou and Yunan.  The SWVPRP involved an investment of about $US400 million
over 1995-2001  from both a World Bank loan and counterpart funding from the Govemment of
3  Though this is not to say that targeting was pe:,rfect.  Using a county-level panel data set for all of
China for the period 1981-1995,  Park et al., (2002) find signs that political factors have affected targeting
and that leakage to non-poor counties has increased  over time while coverage has improved.
5China.  As in other development projects financed by the Bank, there were numerous appraisal
and supervision missions by Bank staff and consultants,  and these missions often probed quite
deeply into the project's local operations,  including numerous visits to participating poor
counties and villages.  Both authors participated in some of these missions and worked closely
with staff of the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) on the design of the survey data collection
done for the purpose of evaluating SWPRP.
The program comprised a range of income-generating  activities including methods for
raising grain yields, animal husbandry, and reforestation.  There was also a component for off-
.farm employment,  including voluntary rural labor mobility and support for township-village
enterprises.  The SWPRP also included local social services and rural infrastructure initiatives,
including tuition assistance to children from poor families, upgrading village school and health
clinics, the construction of rural roads and piped water supply systems.  Table 1 gives the
breakdown of total project investment by category.  In common with other development projects,
the SWPRP provided the capital and technical assistance, but it did not provide insurance, and
many of the project activities are likely to entail non-negligible income risk.  The income gains
will depend on a number of contingencies, including the vagaries of the weather (given the
evident importance of agriculture in the breakdown  in Table 1), uncertain demand for the new
products and risk to earnings from out migration.
The selection of sub-projects aimed to take account of local conditions and the expressed
preferences of participants and local stakeholders.  How much participation by the poor there
was in practice is a moot point.  We discussed this with participants,  and with the sociologist
responsible for assessing the extent of beneficiary participation during supervision missions; it
was clear that the record was mixed, varying from village to village, and county to county.
6Whether in fact the resources transferred  to participants actually financed the identified
project is also unclear.  To some degree all external aid is fungible.  Yes, it could be verified in
supervision that the proposed sub-project was actually completed. But one cannot rule out the
possibility that it would have been done otherwise.  ParticipEnts and local leaders would naturally
have put forward the best development option they saw, even if it was something they planned to
do anyway with the resources already available.  Then there is some other (infra-marginal)
expenditure  that was really being financed by the a,id.  Similarly, there is no way of ruling out the
possibility that non-project villages benefited by a re-assignment of public spending by local
authorities, thus lowering the differential  impact of program participation.
3.  Data for the evaluation
A baseline survey in 1995  was foll]owed by five annual surveys over 1996-2000.  All
surveys were done by the Rural Household Survey (RHS) team of NBS.  The sample  size for the
annual surveys was 2000 households spanning 20' project counties and 200 villages.  (Notice that
our sampled non-project villages also come from project counties; we return to this feature of the
design in the next section.)  It was originally intended to have  100 villages in each of the project
and non-project townships within the project counties.  However,  the assignment of project
villages had not been finalized at the time the samples of villages were drawn, and it turned out
that 13  of the originally sampled non-project villages did in fact get the project.  So we end up
with  113 project villages and 87 non-project villages in the same counties.  10 randomly sampled
households were interviewed in each village (project and non-project).  The sampling methods
followed standard practices for the RHS,  as described in Chen and Ravallion (1996).
There is a serious comparability problem between the 1995 survey and the subsequent
surveys.  Because of delays in the statistics office obtaining the locations of project villages, the
7first survey in December  1995 had little choice but to use a one-time interview method, asking
for recall over the full year. The use of this long recall period is likely to lead to underestimation
of income and consumption, though it is of less concern to the village-level  characteristics to be
used for matching.  The subsequent surveys use the daily diary method and collect much more
accurate  income and consumption data. As a consequence, the rates of income and consumption
growth are very likely to be overestimated using 1995  as the baseline.
Because of these problems in the  1995 survey, we decided to use the 1996  survey as the
baseline instead.  The downside of this choice is that our baseline is not free of contamination by
the project; indeed,  16% of the program's total disbursement on projects at household level had
been made by the middle of 1996, and 23% had been made by the end of 1996.  So we are likely
to be underestimating the program's impact.  We consider the implications of this possibility for
our comparisons  of consumption and income gains.
The surveys were closely modeled on NBS's Rural Household Survey, which is
described in detail in Chen and Ravallion (1996).  This is a good quality budget and income
survey, notable in the care that goes into reducing both sampling and non-sampling  errors.
Sampled households maintain a daily record on all transactions plus log books on production.
Local interviewing assistants (resident in the sampled village, or nearby) visit each household at
roughly two weekly intervals.  Inconsistencies  found at the local (county-level) NBS office are
checked with the respondents.  The sample frame is all registered agricultural households.
The consumption expenditure  aggregate we use is what is referred to as "living
expenditures"  in the RHS.  This comprises cash spending on all goods and services  and imputed
values of in-kind spending.  It excludes  transfer payments (cash or imputed values of transfers to
relatives living in urban areas, interest and insurance payments, fines, transaction costs in
8acquiring assets or changing land-usage), though these only account for a small share of total
spending (3.7% over the whole sample in 1996).  The income  aggregate includes  cash income
from all sources  and imputed values for in-kind income (mainly household production, which
includes farming, forestry, animal husbandry, handicrafts  etc.).
4.  Identification strategy
The standard difference-in-difference  (DD) method compares  changes in measured
outcomes between a treatment group and a comparison group of non-participants.  In this
context, we point to two potentially important sources of bias in this method.  Firstly, we define a
"non-participant"  as a village that did not get the program but is located in a county that did get
the program.  This raises the possibility of interference between the treatment and comparison
groups.  From our field work and discussions with NBS and project staff, we came to the
conclusion that the physical distances involved would not mean that geographic proximity is an
important source of contamination.  However,  sharing a common local government could be a
more serious problem.  Since all project counties are automatically amongst China's nationally-
designated "poor counties" they are covered by the Government's  own national poor-area
program.  This is needed to assure that the companson of income and consumption gains
between project and (matched) non-project villages can reveal the impact of the Bank's program.
However,  this is not as clean an identification strategy as it might seem at first glance.  The fact
that the project and non-project villages come froim the same counties covered under other
programs could generate  a downward bias in our estimated impacts.  This will happen if SVVPRP
displaced other programs in the project villages, to the benefit of the non-project villages in
national poor-counties.  We have no basis for assessing the extent of this possible bias.
9There is a second source of bias that we can go some way toward addressing.  As already
noted, DD will give a biased impact estimate if  the subsequent outcome changes are a function
of initial conditions that also influence the assignment of the sample between the two groups.
This is known to be a serious concern in this context,  based on past research on poor area
programs in the same region of rural  China (Jalan and Ravallion,  1998).  Additionally,  we have
the possibility that the  13 villages that had to switch from the original sample of non-project
villages to the final sample of project villages were somehow purposively selected.
To deal with the observable sources of heterogeneity between our samples of project and
non-project villages we use a flexible,  largely non-parametric,  method of controlling for initial
heterogeneity,  based on the propensity-score  matching (PSM) method introduced by Rosenbaum
and Rubin (1983).  Single-difference  PSM gives unbiased impact estimates as long as there is no
selection bias due to latent heterogeneity.  By taking the double difference  after matching in the
baseline survey we can eliminate any time-invariant additive selection bias.  It has been argued
that combining PSM with DD can greatly reduce (but not eliminate) the bias found in other non-
experimental evaluations (Heckman, Ichimura and Todd,  1997; Heckman et al.,  1998).
To outline the method in more formal terms, let Di be a dummy variable taking the value
unity for any participating village and zero for nonparticipants.  Let P(Xi) = Pr(Di  = lX1 i)
denote the propensity score, giving the probability of participation for unit i conditional  on a
vector  Xi of pre-exposure  control variables.  Rosenbaum  and Rubin (1983) prove that if the Di's
are independent over all i, and outcomes are independent of participation given Xi  (i.e.
unobserved differences  do not influence whether or not i participates)  then outcomes  are also
:independent of participation  given P(X 1 ), just as they would be if participation was assigned
randomly. PSM uses P(X1 )  to select comparison  subjects for each of those treated.  In effect,
10the Rosenbaum-Rubin  result establishes that if no selection bias remains when controlling for
X1 then no bias remains when controlling solely for P(Xi).  We follow common practice in the
matching literature of using a parametric binary response model to estimate the propensity score
for each observation  in the participant and the comparison-group  samples.  The comparisons are
then constrained to assure that project and non-project villages share sufficiently similar values
of their observed characteristics  as reflected in their propensity scores.
The possibility that some treatment  villages may have to be dropped for lack of
sufficiently similar comparators  points to a potentiaLl trade off between two possible sources of
bias in the resulting impact estimates. On the one hand, there is the aforementioned need to
assure comparability in terms of initial characteristics,  to reduce bias in the difference-in-
difference.  This speaks to the importance of common support.  On the other hand, it creates a
new possibility of sampling bias in inferences  about impact on the population of treated villages,
to the extent that we lose treatment villages in achieving common support; this is a well klown
problem in the evaluation literature.4 Recognizing  this trade-off, we also present our estimates
only eliminating non-participating  villages that are outside the propensity-score range found for
treatment villages, while retaining the original  samiple of treatment villages.  For comparison
purposes, we also present estimates without matching.
To test the possibility that the true impact is being hidden by inter-temporal  behavioral
responses, we shall assess impacts on both income (Yi,  for household i at date t) and
consumption (Ci,),  so as to infer savings.  For the purposes of the following exposition we focus
on mean impacts, though one can simply reinterpret the following formulae for some other
summary statistic of the distribution, such as the proportion of people below the poverty line.
4  See the discussion of non-overlapping support bias in Heckman  et al. (1997,  1998).
11We can write the outcome measures for income and consumption of the i'th treatment
household (Di = 1) at date t as:
(YjJDi =1)=Yt  +GY+seY  (i=l,..,n;t=0,..,T)  (1.1)
(Ci,tD 1 = 1) = C*t + Gic + Eft  (i =  l,..,n;t = 0,..,T)  (1.2)
where  Yi,  and Ct are the counter-factual  income and consumption for treatment household i if
the program had not existed,  GiY  and  G5c  are the corresponding gains attributable to the project
and  eiy  and e5, are zero-mean innovation error terms uncorrelated with program participation,
to allow for measurement error in  Yit  and C,*.
Indicators of the counter-factual  are available from a comparison group and are given by
Y. and C,.  These are noisy indicators due to miss-matching (selection bias) arising from latent
heterogeneity.  We make the standard assumption that the selection bias is separable and time
invariant,  and so it is swept away by taking differences  over time.  On taking the expectation
over all participants, the mean differences-in-differences  for income and consumption are:
E[(Yi,  - fit*)  - (Yfo  - ki*)JDi = 1] = E(G1Y,  - Gyo%Di = 1)  (2.1)
E[(Ci - 6i,) - (Cio - C%o)lD. = 1] = E(G,c - GcoID, = 1)  (2.2)
(Noting that, by assumption, the differenced error terms  Cy - CY  and  E c  - EC  have zero
expected value amongst participants.  Equations 3.1  and 3.2 also implicitly entail averaging over
the distributions of the control variables used in matching.)  When period 0 is a genuine baseline
prior to the intervention (and not in any way contaminated by the program assignment) we have
G,yo = Gco  = 0.  Then DD estimates the mean current gains in consumption and income for
12program participants  (often referred to as the "treatment effect on the treated" in the evaluation
literature).  We will consider the implications  for otW' results of the possibility that  GiyZ  =  ￿  # ° .
5.  Saving out of the income  gains tfrom a (leveloplnent  project
By separately estimating the income and consumption  gains, the above formulation of the
evaluation problem allows for saving out of the current income gains.  Before turning to the
empirical results it is of interest to ask: why might w e find that the income gains are saved?
As a benchmark model, consider Friedman's (1957) F'ermanent Income Hypothesis,
(PIH).  This assumes that consumption is directly proportional to permanent income (the amnuity
value of life-time wealth).  In our case, perrnanent income has a counter-factual component (in
the absence of the program) and a component due to the program (which is zero in the absence of
the program).  The contribution of the program to penmanent income is denoted  G[/P  and  GJ7 is
a transient component such that the full impact on income can be written as:
G,'  = G tr  + Gf,  1(3)
The counter-factual  is independent of participation and we assume that this is also true of any
measurement error or transient consumption.
We focus initially on the special case in which there is no saving from permanent income.
Thus we have the following model for consumption  with ancd without the program:
(C,t 2 Di = 1) = YtP  + G/' + v,  (4.1)
(C1, lDi = O)= Yij  + vit  (4.2)
in which we allow for a zero-mean innovation error term,  vi, . Comparing (4.1) with (1.2) it is
plain that G,  = G,C + Cl, + . c - Yi*r  - vi,  = G  c  since  (Cit J,Di = 0)  = Yt,  + vit  = C,'t + esi't.
13Thus, the current consumption gain from the program identifies the impact on  permanent
income.  Positive saving from the income gain (Gy  > Gfc) reveals that some of that gain is
thought to be transient by program participants.
This benchmark model makes a number of strong assumptions, most notably that
permanent income is entirely consumed, there are no constraints on borrowing and there are no
transaction costs or sources of lumpiness in consumption.5 As the following discussion will
illustrate, more general models suggest other reasons why the current income gains from a
development project might be saved.
One reason is uncertainty about how much of the gain is in fact permanent. Participants
may then save as a hedge against the income uncertainty. This will happen (even without
borrowing constraints) if the marginal utility of consumption is a convex function of
consumption.  By Jensen's inequality, a mean-preserving increase in uncertainty about future
incomes will then increase the marginal utility of future consumption, leading to higher savings
(Gersovitz,  1988).  There is evidence of such precautionary saving in the same setting as the
SWPRP (Jalan and Ravallion, 2001).
Introducing borrowing constraints into the PIH can also generate savings from permanent
income gains.  The PIH assumes perfect credit and risk markets, which does not appear to be
realistic.6 Assume instead that households can save but not borrow. The anticipation of future
borrowing constraints when negative income shocks are experienced may well lead program
participants to save from an increase in permanent income, as a contribution to their buffer stock.
Nonconvexities in consumption could also distort the empirical relationship between the
5  As originally formulated, the PIH also assumes that labor supply is exogenous and that
preferences  are homothetic.
6  Jalan and Ravallion  (1998) provide evidence for this region of China that rural households  are not
well insured against income shocks, and that this insurance failure is more severe  for the asset-poor.
14permanent income gains and changes in current consumption.  The nonconvexity can stemn  from
lumpiness  in certain expenditures, given borrowing constraints.  Small income gains will be
saved to overcome the constraint.
Yet a further reason for high savings  from a project's  income gains posits that the
investments raise the marginal product of private capital - 1hat the program inputs are cooperant
with private capital in production - and that private capital is geographically immobile, so that
the marginal product of capital is equalizedl with a local rate of interest, that varies
geographically.  (This is the type of model outlined in more formal terms in Jalan and Ravallion,
2002, who find supportive evidence for this region of rural China.)  Under these conditions, the
program  can induce higher saving through its effect on the marginal product of private capital.
All these modifications to the PIH will tend to create  lags between the program's initial
income gains and the impacts  on consumption.  Higher living standards might not then be
evident until after SWPRP's completion.  .By tracking annual income and consumption gains
over time we can look for signs of lagged impacts  on consumption.
The political economy of a local developrment project might also generate low impacts on
living standards despite the income gains.  This will happen if the direct income gains are
somehow expropriated by higher-level (county or provincial) authorities  and diverted to other
uses, possibly benefiting non-project villages elsevwhere.  Recall that our consumption  aggregates
exclude transfer payments.  We will check if transfers responded positively to the project,
consistent with some form of expropriation.  The cl  namnics of income and consumption impacts
will also offer clues as to the plausibility of this political economy explanation.  If the local
income gains were being siphoned off by a higher level of government then one would expect to
see little sign of lagged consumption  gains after an income  gain due to the project. An
15expropriation model would also lead one to expect declining income gains, through disincentive
effects of the expropriation.  We will look for these features in the income profile over time of
consumption and income gains attributed to SWPRP.
6.  Results
Table 2 gives sample means by year.  Project villages started worse off on average than
non-project villages, in terms of both income and consumption.  By the end of the period, the
project villages had caught up in mean income, but not consumption.  This is suggestive of
saving from the project's income gains.  But before drawing that conclusion we need to consider
the possibility of selection bias arising from the initial differences  between project and non-
project villages arising from the program's purposive targeting.
6.1  Matching methods
To estimate the propensity scores, the sampled project and non-project villages are
pooled and we run a probit regression for the village assignment to these two groups.  We
include as explanatory variables virtually all the village level variables for 1995 that could be
constructed from the data set.  Table 3 gives the results.
We find a number of significant covariates of program participation.  SWPRP villages
tend to be in more mountainous remote areas,  are less likely to have electricity, less likely to
have a school in the village or nearby, though more likely to have a health clinic within the
village relative to nearby.  The project villages  also tend to have higher populations, with lower
mean income and more land per capita, reflecting lower population density.  It is evident from
Table 3 that the project villages tend to be poorer than other villages within the project counties.
Figure 1 gives the frequency distribution of the propensity scores based on Table 3 for
project and non-project villages.  It can be seen that there are regions of non-overlapping
16support.  We consider two methods of matching.  In the first, all  matches must be within the
outer bounds of the region of common suppont for the propensity scores; we refer to this as
"outer-support matching".  In the second methLod,  comparisons are only permitted if the absolute
difference in propensity scores is within pre-determined caliper bounds; we call this "caliper-
bound matching."  Project and non-project villages  outside the caliper bounds are discarded.  This
method clearly gives the closest matching of treatment and conirol villages, but it can do so at a
cost to sample size and representativeness.  We set the tolerance levels  for the caliper at 0.01.
The choice of this tolerance  is somewhat arbitrary.  However,  we found that too many villages
were lost when the tolerance went much below 0.01.  I]f one was relying on single difference
matching then one would probably want closer matches than our 0.01 absolute difference in
scores.  However, here we can exploit the fact. that we have multiple observations to "difference-
out" any (time-invariant)  errors due to miss-matching.  With 0.0)1  tolerance level, we end up with
only 63 of the original  sample of project villages to be matched, with 34 non-project villages.
6.2  Impact estimates
Given that the project's main aim was poverty reduction,  we begin by calculating the
impact on poverty incidence  in the final year of the study period.  We use probably the most
common measure of absolute poverty in developing countries, namely the proportion of the
population living in households with consumption per person below the international poverty
line of $ 1/day at 1993 Purchasing Power Parity (Chein and Ravallion,  2001); this is equivalent to
808 Yuan per year per person at 1995 prices.
Table 4 gives the results.  We find redluctions  in the incidence of poverty due to the
program, though the magnitude varies by matching method.  The biggest difference is not
between the unmatched DD and matched DD, but ralher between the two methods of matching.
17The unmatched DD and matched DD using the outer-support criterion indicate that the poverty
rate by the end of the study period had fallen by 5-6 percentage points due to the project.
However, using caliper-bound matching, we find no impact on poverty.
To test robustness to the choice of poverty line, Figure 2 gives our estimate of impact
over the whole distribution. The figure gives the difference between the empirical cumulative
distribution function of consumption for the treatment villages  and the counter-factual
comparison group. (The results are similar for unmatched DD as for outer-support matching,  so
we only give results for matched DD to make the figure easier to read.)  For caliper-bound
matching we find that the negligible poverty impact for the $ 1/day line is not robust to the choice
of poverty line, with more sizable impacts emerging amongst the poorest and least poor in the
project villages.  (The impacts become statistically significant at about 6 percentage points.)
Table 5 gives the unmatched DD estimates of mean impacts, while Table 6 gives the
matched DD estimates using both matching methods described above. We give the annual
impacts, the two-year moving average of the annual impact and the cumulative impacts.
Let us focus first on the results for the final year of the study period, 2000.  While we
find sizeable income  gains over time in the project villages, this is not evident for the counter-
factual comparison group.  It should be recalled that  1996 was a particularly good year for rural
incomes given that the government had substantially increased the overall level of its
procurement prices for foodgrains at this time; the change was short-lived however.  So the small
counter-factual  gain that we find is not too surprising.  (This nicely illustrates the importance of
differencing out the changes in the comparison group; in the absence of the project one would
have expected a similar income decline in the treatment villages.)
18Taking account of both the changes over time and the differences  between the treatment
and comparison villages, the estimated double difference for 2000 indicates an income gain
attributable  to the project of around  17-210/% of initial mean income (depending on the matching
method).7 However, we find little or no imLpact on consumption; indeed, we cannot reasonably
reject the null hypothesis that the consumption  impact over the whole period is zero.  The vast
bulk of the income gain in 2000 was saved.
Recall that we are measuring consumption by "living expenditures"  in the RHS.  So our
definition of "savings" implicitly includes transfer payments.  One can question whether some of
these transfer payments should be included as savings.  However, transfer payments do not
account for the high savings out of the pro.iect's income  gains.  Indeed, mean transfer payment
actually fell slightly in the project villages over 1996-2000, and we found that the DD estimate
was negative though not significantly  so.
As noted in section 2, there are likely to have been impacts in 1996.  On the assumption
that these gains would have initially impacted on incomes rather than consumptions, we will
have underestimated the true income impact and -underestimated the extent of saving from the
current income  gains.  As we will see below, the inter-temporal pattern of income and
consumption impacts within the evaluation period, offers support for this conclusion.
To see the impact of this high savings rate on the poverty measures, we re-calculated the
DD estimates using incomes.  For the unmatched DD and the matched DD using outer-support
criterion, the impacts on income poverty wvere  11.5% points (t = -4.03) and 11.3%  (t = -3.65)
respectively (instead of 5.0 and 6.3% for consumption poverty).  The impact is greater using
caliper-bound  matching; instead of the very small 0.6 percentage point impact on consurnption
7  Note that the baseline means differ for caliper-bound matching, given the change in the number
of project villages used for the analysis.  The 1996 mean income for the 63 project villages used for the
caliper-bound matching is 968.75 Yuan.
19poverty using the $/day line by the caliper-bound matching, we find that the income poverty rate
fell by 15.7% points (t = -4.41).  Figure 3 gives the impacts on income poverty over the whole
distribution.  Comparing Figures 2 and 3 it is evident that the largest divergence between the
income and consumption impacts tends to be in the middle of the distribution.
We have seen that the results for 2000 suggest that virtually all of the aggregate income
gain was saved.  Let us now turn to the results for the three intervening years,  1997-99,  as also
given in Tables 5 and 6.  We will focus on the results for outer-support matching, noting any
marked differences with the results for the other two methods.
Mean income was higher in all years due to the project and significantly so in all years
except 1999.  The gains were lower in the second and third years than the first and last.  Despite
the large income gain in the first year, there was negligible impact on consumption in that year.
Appreciably higher consumption only emerged in the second year (1998).  The relatively low
income gain in 1999 was followed by a lower impact on consumption in 2000.  By the end of the
study period, 50% of the cumulative income gain attributed to the project had been saved.
Caliper-bound matching gives  an even higher savings rate, of 58%.
While one should be cautious with only four annual observations, there is a pattern in
Tables 5 and 6 that is suggestive of lagged consumption impacts from the project's income gains.
The high income gains in 2000 may then be expected to be reflected in higher future
consumption,  beyond the study period.  Neither the signs of lagged consumption impacts nor the
fact that the highest income gains were in the last year are supportive of the existence  of some
hidden form of expropriation of the project's income gains.
Comparing the three evaluation methods, the most notable difference  is that caliper-
bound matching tends to give lower impact estimates than the other two methods.  This is not
20consistent with the expectation discussed in section 2 that the relatively poorer villages targeted
by such a program would tend to have intrirsically lower growth prospects; if anything we find
the opposite, though the difference  is small.  However, it should be recalled that our comparison
villages were chosen from the same (poor) counties  as the project villages.  The bias in
unmatched comparisons  might well only enmerge when making comparisons across project and
non-project counties, given that there can be large inter-county differences in initial conditions
relevant to growth prospects  (Jalan and Ravallion,  1998).
6.3  Implications
Our estimated income gains from the SWPRP can be interpreted as the output returns
from the project's investments within the disbursement period.  Let I,  denote the project's real
investment in period t and let  N1 denote the number of beneficiaries  in that year.  Given a period
t rate of return from the project of r, , the income imipact can be written as:
G,Y=r  Ij/Nj  (t1,..,T)  (5)
j=1
From the project documents we calculated  the total investment by the Bank and Government.
By the end of the project this was  1120 Yuan  per person per year in 1995 prices, averaged over
the population of project villages.  This is the cumulative investment over the project cycle per
beneficiary.  Table 7 gives the corresponding numbers by year.8 The table also gives the values
of r, from equation (9) using the income gains fronm Tables 5 and 6.
8  These were calculated from the project documents using the cumulative total project investments
(deflated to  1995 prices) normalized by the cumulative number of beneficiaries. However,  the project
documents only give the number of households covered by the project.  To obtain the per capita
disbursements we used mean household size in the full sample of project villages by province and year.
21We find average rates of return of 9-10%.  This could be an underestimate,  to the extent
that the Bank's program displaced other programs in the project villages, to the benefit of the
non-project villages.  (Recalling that project and non-project villages come from national-poor
areas covered under other poor-area programs.)
The fact that the project and comparison villages were drawn from the same national-
poor counties covered by the Government's pre-exiting programs means that the rates of return
in Table 7 should be interpreted  as incremental returns from the Bank's program on top of the
G-overnment's programs.  Jalan and Ravallion (1998) estimated an average  rate of return of 12%
for the Government's poor area development program in the same region of China over 1985-90.
lJsing different methods, Park et al., (2002) also estimate a rate of return to the Government's
national poor-area program of 12% in the period  1992-95.9  So the compound rate of return from
the SWPRP and the Government's own program is 22-23%.
However, it can also be seen from Table 7 that the annual returns varied substantially
from year to year, though disbursement per beneficiary  did not. So the considerable volatility
that we find in the income gains from the project is not due to variability in the cumulative
program investments but is due to fluctuation in the returns on that investment.  A simple way to
gauge the importance of the inter-temporal variability in returns to the variation in project impact
is to ask what the range (maximum minus minimum) in impact estimates would have been at the
time-mean rate of return (Table 7).  We find that this simulated range in impacts accounts for
less than one tenth of the actual range (9%  without matching and 1%  and 6% for the two
rnatching methods respectively).
9  Park et al., (2002) used regional growth regressions, estimated at county level. (The Jalan and
Ravallion,  1998, method was described earlier in this paper.)
22The income  gains from the program would appear to be more variable over time than
other income sources.  From Table 2, the range of annual mean incomes  is about 16% of the
overall mean in the project villages while the range of the project's income impacts is about
150% of the mean impact.  And this difference appears to be reflected in the savings rates.  The
baseline data indicate that 16-17%  of income was saved in the project villages (Table 2).  As
already noted, the baseline year was a gooel year for agriculture,  due to unusually high foodgrain
procurement prices  set by the government.  So presuLmably the average saving rate in that year
was, if anything, higher than normal.  By contrast, we find that the average saving rate from the
income gains during the life of the project was 50%.
With such variability in the income gains  firom the project, one can conjecture that project
participants  would have had a hard time inferring the projecl's impact on permanent income.
This is consistent with the argument that the high saving rate out of the income gains implied by
our results for the evaluation period as a whole reflects transience or uncertainty in the project's
income gains.  Furthermore, none of the other possible explanations for high saving from the
project's income  gains appear to be as plaLusible in the light of our empirical findings.
Explanations that posit that the project increased the returns to saving (to overcome borrowing
constraints) would appear to have a hard time explaining the variability over time that we find in
the savings rate from tbe project's income gains.  The facts that the high aggregate savings rate is
not attributable to measured transfer payments, and that income gains do not fall over time, are
not supportive of the expropriation model discusseid  in section 5.
The variability in returns has implications  for the design of evaluations.  It is common for
evaluation designs to only have one follow-up survey. Near the end of the project. Such designs
can clearly be deceptive.  Suppose for exarmple that the design had relied on only two surveys,
23one in 1996 (just after the project began) and one in 1999 (just before it finished).  This
evaluation  design would have considerably underestimated the average annual income gain from
the project, and overestimated the consumption gain, given the time path of the underlying
income gains.  Or suppose that one only knew the income gains in the last year (as given in
Tables 5 and 6). One would then conclude that the rate of return was  18%.  However, the result
for the last year is hardly indicative of other years (Table 7).
7.  Conclusions
We have studied the impacts of a rural development project in China over the bulk of its
disbursement  cycle.  On comparing income changes in project villages with those in matched
non-project villages, we find that the project resulted in an average income gain over five years
of around 10% of baseline mean income, representing  an average return on the project's
disbursements of about 9-10%,  on top of the impact of the Government's pre-existing assistance
to poor areas.
However, we find that half of the cumulative income gain was saved, so that the project's
=mpact is far less evident in participants'  consumptions.  Indeed, on comparing the final year of
ihe study period with the first, we find little or no impact on mean consumption or on
consumption poverty using an international "$/day" poverty line, though the poverty impact
depends critically on the poverty line used; there are indications of significant impacts on
consumption poverty for lower poverty lines.
We find large year-to-year differences  in impact. For example, the estimated income gain
in the final year was 23% of baseline income (an  18% return on the project's total disbursement)
and virtually all of this was saved. The impact variability was primarily due to variability in the
annual returns to the program's  investments rather than the level of that investment.
24Our results reject the commonly held view ihat poor people tend to rapidly consurne the
income gains from a development project.  Indeed, we find a high saving rate.  Wrhen interpreted
in terms of the Permanent Income Hypothesis,  our results imply that participants felt that a large
share of the income gains was likely to be transient. Uncertainty about future incomes and future
borrowing possibilities can also lead to high saving out of the income gains from such a
program.  The considerable  variability that we find in the programs'  income retums suggests that
participants would have had a hard time assessing the program's impact on permnanent incomae.
Finding that even poor participants choose to save a large share of the current incoime
gains from external aid has an important implicationi for assessments  of the efficacy of anti-
poverty programs, given their finite time horizons and that it is common to study poverty impacts
within a relatively short period of time - often no more than the period of the disbursement
cycle.  A large share of the impact on peoples'  living standards may occur beyond the life of the
project.  This does not necessarily mean that credible evaluations will need to track welfare
impacts over much longer periods than is typically the case, raising concerns  about feasibility.
But it does suggest that evaluations  need to look carefully at impacts on partial intermediate
indicators of longer-term impacts - such as incomes in our case - even when good measures
of the welfare objective - consumption in our case - are available  within the project cycle.
The choice of such indicators will need to be informned by an understanding of participants'
behavioral responses to the program.





Labor mobility  9.74
Rural infrastructure  17.24
Agriculture  43.05
Rural enterprise development  11.52
Institution building  1.69
Project and poverty monitoring  2.78
Total  100.00
Table 2: Mean household income and consumption per capita by year
Project villages  Non-project villages
Mean  Std.  dev.  Mean  Std. dev.
1996  Income  992.74  713.47  1155.47  603.45
Consumption  841.13  468.63  943.66  444.38
1997  Income  1084.86  658.14  1148.86  628.80
Consumption  874.72  441.08  954.57  512.99
1998  Income  1108.91  603.27  1189.28  680.96
Consumption  937.01  541.27  951.11  497.81
1999  Income  1182.23  681.62  1285.25  807.03
Consumption  1002.91  658.89  1050.27  591.22
2000  Income  1259.47  913.70  1225.22  669.92
Consumption  943.09  579.15  1023.31  696.10
Note: Household-size  weighted means in Yuan per year at 1995 prices using
Provincial Rural CPI. Sample sizes: 1130 households in project villages and 870
households  in non-project villages (10 households per village in both cases).
26Table 3: Probit regression of village  participation in the SWPRP
Coefficient  Z score
Village on the plains  Reference
Hills  4.6023  2.651
Mountainous  2.6301  1.616
Whether village has electricity  -0.8272  -1.722
... telephones  -0.1088  -0.248
... road passing through it  0.4085  0.971
... radio transmitters  0.41583  0.972
Whether village can receive TV transmission  0.2141  0.531
Located <5 km from the nearest market  0.3084  0.364
...  5 -10 km from the nearest market  -0.3476  -0.406
..  .10  -20 km from the nearest market  1.1554  1.167
... > 20 km  Reference
# of days in a cycle during which the market as3embles  -0.0888  -0.662
County town within 5 km  Reference
Distance from village to county town is 5-10 kIn  1.1096  1.230
... 10-20 kmI  -0.6387  -0.842
... >20In  -0.4168  -0.596
Township=-village  Reference
Distance from village to township is within 5 km  0.5466  0.609
... 5 -10 km  0.7336  0.877
... 10-20 km  -1.0477  -1.141
Main mode of transportation  used by the villager: bicycle  -0.5539  -1.026
.bus  -0.1329  -0.415
...  other automobile  0.6948  1.440
...  walking  Reference
Nearest train station is within  5 km  -0.1729  -0.192
... 5-lOkm  I  1.1186  1.137
... 10-20 km  n  0.4978  0.429
... >20 kmI  Reference
Nearest bus station is within 5 km  -0.0173  -0.050
...5-10Ia  0.2013  0.432
... 10-20 km  n  0.3736  0.718
... > 20  km  Reference
Whether village has a day-care center  0.5773  0.848
Elementary school is in village  Reference
Nearest elementary school is within 5 km  0.0520  0.128
...  5-10 kmn  0.5050  0.900
Middle school is in village  Reference
Nearest middle school is within 5 km  0.8846  1.871
... 5-10 Ian  -0.0652  -0.142
... 10-20 km  1.6566  2.416
... >20 km  1.3317  1.847
27Medical clinic in village  Reference
Nearest medical clinic is within 5 km  -1.0271  -2.322
...  5-10 km  -0.2405  -0.518
...  10-20 km  -0.8605  -1.290
...  >20 km  -0.5790  -0.581
Total population of the village  0.0004  2.097
Elevated  land (mu)  -0.0016  -2.653
Forest land (mu)  0.0000  -1.160
# of people work in TVE over # of labor.  0.0845  1.135
Whether village has TVE  -0.4689  -1.027
Output of grain per capita (kg/person)  0.0019  1.732
Net income per capita  -0.0033  -3.349
(End of year) # of pigs per person  0.7031  1.274
(End of year) # of cows per person  0.3248  0.267
(End of year) # of sheep, goat per person  0.6432  1.034
(End of year) # of poultry per person  0.4133  2.608
(End of year) # of honey bee per person  -5.1474  -1.765
Workforce per capita  0.0463  1.506
Average household  size  -0.0785  -0.992
Share of workforce female  -0.1132  -1.875
Cultivated land per capita (mu).  1.3591  2.685
Grassland per capita (mu)  2.5915  1.926
Guangxi  1.4329  2.198
Guizhou  1.1390  1.656
Intercept  -4.2891  -1.649
Pseudo-R2 0.3130
Note: The village is the unit of observation (n=200) and all explanatory variables
are pre-intervention  (1995).
Table 4:  Impacts of SWPRP on poverty in 2000
(1)  (2)
1996 poverty incidence (H)  Change in H in  Change in H in  Double difference
in  project villages(%)  project villages  comparison villages  (l)-(2)
No matching (113 project  villages compared  to 87 non-project villages)
57.86  -6.66  -1.63  -5.03 (-1.75)
Outer-support  matching (113 villages matched with 71 comparison villages)
57.86  -6.66  -0.33  -6.33 (-2.07)
Caliper-bound  matching (63 project  villages matched with 34 comparison  villages)
59.72  -4.00  -3.39  -0.61 (-0.17)
Note: Poverty line =808 Yuan per year per person (1995) prices, equivalent to $1.08 per day at 1993  consumption
PPP.  1130 sampled households in project villages;  870 in non-project villages. T-ratios for the null hypothesis that
DD=-0  in parentheses.
28Table 5:  Unmatched difference-in-difference  estiimates
(2)  Difference-in-difference
(1)  Gain in  (1)-(2)
Gain in project  comparison  Two-year moving
villages  villages  Annual  average  Cumulative
1997
Income  92.12  -6.61  98.72  (3.C07)  n.a.  n.a.
Consumption  33.59  10.91  22.68 (1.07)  n.a.  n.a.
Saving  58.53  -17.51  76.04 (2.34)  n.a.  n.a.
1998
Income  116.17  33.81  82.36 (2.63)  90.54  181.08
Consumption  95.88  7.45  88.43  (3.77)  55.56  111.12
Saving  20.29  26.36  -6.07 (-0.:1 8)  34.98  69.97
1999
Income  189.48  129.78  59.70 (1.65)  71.03  240.79
Consumption  161.77  106.61  55.16 (1.93)  71.80  166.28
Saving  27:71  23.17  4.54 (0.13)  -0.77  74.51
2000
Income  266.73  69.76  197.97 (5.14)  128.34  437.75
Consumption  101.96  79.65  22.31 (0.81)  38.74  188.59
Saving  164.77  -9.89  174.66 (4.49)  89.60  249.17
Note:  Household-size weighted means in Yuan at 1995 prices with all  11 3 sampled project villages compared to 87
sampled non-project villages.  T-ratios for the null hypothesis that DD=0 in parentheses.
29Table 6:  Matched difference-in-difference  estimates
(2)  Difference-in-difference
(1)  Gain in  (1)-(2)
Gain in project  comparison  Two-year
villages  villages  Annual  m.a.  Cumulative
Outer-support  matching (113 villages matched with  71 comparison villages)
1997
Income  92.12  -9.02  101.14 (2.90)  n.a.  n.a.
Consumption  33.59  17.16  16.44 (0.71)  n.a.  n.a.
Saving  58.53  -26.18  84.70 (2.43)  n.a.  n.a.
1998
Income  116.17  46.29  69.88 (2.06)  85.51  171.02
Consumption  95.88  7.90  87.98 (3.50)  52.21  104.42
Saving  20.29  38.39  -18.10 (-0.51)  33.30  66.60
1999
[ncome  189.48  146.95  42.53 (1.09)  56.21  213.55
Consumption  161.77  84.83  76.94 (2.55)  82.46  181.36
Saving  27.71  62.12  -34.41  (-0.92)  -26.26  32.19
2000
[ncome  266.73  69.11  197.62 (4.77)  120.08  411.17
Consumption  101.96  78.47  23.49 (0.80)  50.22  204.85
Saving  164.77  -9.36  174.13  (4.17)  69.86  206.32
Caliper-bound matching (63 project vilages matched with 34 comparison  vUlages)
1997
Income  110.70  15.35  95.35 (2.37)  n.a.  n.a.
Consumption  47.79  30.36  17.43  (0.63)  n.a.  n.a.
Saving  62.91  -15.00  77.92 (1.92)  n.a.  n.a.
1998
'Income  113.47  31.68  81.79 (2.19)  88.57  177.14
Consumption  99.26  18.87  80.38 (2.86)  48.91  97.82
Saving  14.22  12.81  1.41  (0.03)  39.66  79.32
1999
]ncome  187.81  179.49  8.32 (0.16)  45.05  185.46
Consumption  148.52  93.95  54.57 (1.61)  67.48  152.39
Saving  39.29  85.54  -46.25 (-0.88)  -22.42  33.07
2000
Income  178.66  -22.36  201.02 (4.55)  104.67  386.48
Consumption  85.60  75.94  9.66 (0.27)  32.12  162.05
Saving  93.06  -98.30  191.36 (4.21)  72.55  224.43
N4ote:  Household-size  weighted means in Yuan at 1995 prices. T-ratios for the null hypothesis that DD=0 in
parentheses.
30Table 7: Cumulative investment and returns by year
Cumulative  investrnent per  Year-specific rate of return (%)
project participant  Unmatched DD  Outer-support  Caliper-bound
(Yuan/person;  1995 prices)  matched DD  matched DD
1997  1087  9.1  9.3  8.8
1998  1060  7.8  6.6  7.7
1999  998  6.0  4.3  0.8
2000  1120  17.7  17.6  17.9
Average  1066  10.2  9.5  8.8
Figure 1: Histograms of the propensity scores




31Figure 2: Impacts on consumption poverty
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